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introduction 
Having taken some constitution and government courses during my undergraduate 
studies, I was comfortable with my understanding of justice and morality. An independent 
research seminar into the philosophy oflaw with Dr. Huenemann changed that. Taking Brian 
Leiter 's book Naluralizing Juri.lprudence as our gu ide, we dived into the vast question of "what 
is the law?" This seemingly simple question has shaped western society in too many ways to 
acco unt. 
for instance, Legal Realists - one group that believes all rights "are the creations of 
government and the legal rules it lays down,,1 - dramatically changed labor laws in the earl y 20th 
century by changing the long-held belief that property rights were static. If their philosophy 
hadn ' t become popular, would courts have continued to side with factory owners in post-
industrial America? Consequently, if resulting labor laws such as the Norri s-LaGuardia Act of 
1932 hadn ' t been enacted, what wou ld our society look like today? 
I began to understand that justice. morality, and the law are intricately tied , and how we 
understand anyone of them will affect the others. More, I realized that legal phi losophy is in 
constant motion, adapting to vogue ideas. Society, built upon the principle of law, likewise 
sways in harmony with legal philosophy. 
The following is one perspective of what the law is. Though no theory is completely 
dominant today. Legal Positivism as formulated by 1-l.L.A. Hart, has arguably had the greatest 
impact on legal philosophy since the 20th century. 
Organization 
This paper will explore Legal Positi vism (hereafter referred to as Positi vism), a theory 
that argues for the interpretation of law through social rules. Its implications concerning 
I Altman, Arguing Abollt Law pg. 97 
morality and authority will be discussed, as will arguments of its detractors. An analysis of John 
Austin's Command Theory, accred ited as the first Positivist theory, will be given, as will 
contemporary forms of Positivism. Within contemporary Positivism there exist two opposing 
schools, each answering the role of morality within law in its own way. Both versions will be 
presented, with criticisms of both also included. 
Following the outline of Positivism, the theory will be contrasted to Kant' s ideal of the 
law. Comparisons and differences in the two approaches will receive al1ention, leading to further 
understanding of Positivism. Lastly, Pos itivist trends within mainstream Mormonism will be 
discussed, of which it is hoped, will shed light on the theory's practical side. The two 
concluding sections each include a brief explanation. so as to clarify their organization and for 
ease of reading. 
The latter two essays were originally presented to research conferences at Utah State 
University (2010 LPSC Student Research Symposium) and the University of Utah (2010 
intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference). For inclusion into this paper, they've been 
edited and updated. 
Jonathan Chambers, raised in Cache Valley, Utah, is a 2005 graduate of MOLU1tain Crest High 
School. As a Presidentia l Scholar, Lillywhite recipient, and Research Fellow, he had the 
opportuni ty to study under various professors in the Philosophy department - the highlight of his 
undergraduate career. Former research proj ects were presented at the 20 I 0 Intermountain West 
Student Philosophy Conference , University of Utah; 2010 HASS Colloq ui Lull, Utah State 
University; 2010 Research Day, Utah State University; and 2009 I-lASS Co lloq uium, Utah State 
University. Whi le earn ing hi s B.A. in Philosophy and minor in Political Science, he spent the 
summer of20 I 0 li vi ng in La Rioja, Spain , learning Spanish. 
He will graduate in Spring 20 I I, following which he wi ll move to Ann Arbor, Michigan. There 
he will pLtrsue hi s Juris Doctorate and fi nd a career in public interest lalV. 
Legal Positivism 
What is Legal Positivism? 
Principally arising as a confutation of Natural Law theory, Positivism is a theory oflaw 
that is based on social facts and not on moral claims. Positivism holds that law is based on social 
facts that have been posited, or assertions, from authoritati ve figures (heads of state, judges, 
legislators, etc). that qualify as law. These social facts. as will be investi gated later in the 
Pedigree Thesis. are founded on social establi shment, and not on morality. 
While morality and law may share similarities, and are used synonymously at times, they 
are separate fields. "The positi vist thesis does not say that law's merits are unintelligible, 
unimportant , or periphera l to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determ ine wbether 
laws or legal systems exist. "! 
An example of the similarity between law and morality in legal systems today is their 
joint condemnation of murder. While Natmal Law theory, the legal embodiment of morality, 
would denounce murder on moral grounds and incidentally on legal grounds. Positi vism would 
condemn murder on legal grounds, with little or no regard for moral justifi cation. furthermore, 
while one version ofPositivism-lnciusionary Positivism or soft positivism. might argue that a 
moral value has become a social fact and thus become legally valid, Exclusionary Positivism or 
hard positivism, would deny tlle influence of morality in the formation o[law (except tlu'ough 
abstract means, further detai led on pages 4-6). These two versions will later be di scussed in 
greater length. 
! Stanfo rd Encyclopedia ~ Legal Pos iti vism 
In Positivism's view, the laws of Nazi Germany, some being morally unjust, were legally 
valid. Examples of this include the laws that deprived Jews of property and life. These laws were 
morally unfair; nevertheless, according to Positivism, were legall y-legitimate. 
In short, Positivism has two distinguishing characteristics: 
I. Morality and law share no necessary connection. Though law shares certain featu res 
with morality, it does not depend upon morality for its justification. This is referred to as the 
Separability Thesis. 
2. Law is a social invention. Various methods are employed in the determination of who 
or what quali fies as a social authority. These social facts establish what qualifies as law. This is 
refen'ed to as the Pedigree Thesis. 
Separating Law & Morality 
The Separability Thesis. one ann of Positi vism. argues for the separation of law and 
morality, as separate fields of inquiry. John Austin wrote. "the existence of law is one thing; its 
merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard , is a different enquiry."" What the law is, independent of 
morality. is one thing. What it ought to be, dependent upon morality, is another. No matter how 
"just, wise, efficient, or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, 
and the fact that it is lUljuSt, un wise. inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for 
doubting il.,,3 
To illustrate the LP view, an excellent point made by Andrew Altman may be useful. 
"From the day they took power in Germany in 1933. the Nazis ruthlessly suppressed all political 
~ Stanford Encyclopedia - Legal Posit ivism 
] Stanford Encyclopedia - Legal Posit ivism 
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opposition ... The Nazi regime enacted secret laws in order to persecute its enemies, applied laws 
retroactively to absolve of criminal responsibility Party members who used direct violence, and 
intimidated judges who would not twist and stretch the meaning oftbe laws to favor Nazi 
goals ... During the time of Nazi rule, there were private citizens who sought to take advantage of 
the brutality and law'lessness of the regime ... they [informed] the authorities of allegedly illegal 
acts performed by ri vals or enemies against whom they had a personal grudge. [After the war] 
many Germans demanded the punislunent of the informers.,,4 Altman raises this situation and 
then questions whether the informers should have been charged for previously legal activity. 
The question boils down to whether the Grudge Informers, as tbey became known, had 
violated the law. Legal Positivists take the position that they did 1101 violate the law by 
informing on their neighbors. Though this position seems unpopular, it is disconce11ing to many 
to strip a law' s validity based on political circumstances. If legality is dependent on morality, as 
Natural Law theory argues, then the actions of the United States in regulating 311d fostering the 
slave trade weren't legal. However, few legal theorists today would go so far as to say they were 
illegal; morally despicable, yes, but illegal, 110 5 
By taking the position that Grudge Informers were within the law, Legal Positivists aren't 
necessarily COlllillitted to condoning the Grudge Informers. Rather, the position merely entails 
that punislunent not be based on the illegality of their actions. 
Within Legal Positivism, two juxtaposed schools of thought have arisen over this 
sep31·ation. One, referred to as Soft Positivism (Inclusionary Positi vism), 31'gues that law 311d 
morality do not necessarily sh31'e common ground. A similar yet di fferent claim is made by 
.j Altman, Arguing Aholl{ Law pg. 20 
5 This topic receives f1ll1her attention in the Pedigree Thesis section. but it can be strongly argued thm governmental 
actions are legal by virtue of their source, thus fU11her disputing the idea that laws should be vie"" illegal because of 
political change. 
J 
Hard Positivism (Exclusionary Positivism), that morali ty necessarily is not configured into law. 
These two versions of interpreting the Separability thesis have led to different schools of thought 
concerning the proper role of morality in law. 
Inclusionarv Positivism 
Inclusionary Positivism OP), as put forth by H.L.A. Hart, consists in, " [the 1 simple 
contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands 
of morality, though in fac t they have often done SO.,,6 In other words, in any given lawful 
society, it is not necessary that " laws reproduce ... demands of morality," though this has often 
been the case. Laws of a legal system may consist in, though not depend upon, morality in 
exercise and adjudication. for example, if a law uses morally based language, then that law 
doesn ' t derive its basis from morality , only its fLmction - specific to that law. 
Interestingly, Hart acknowledges that the very existence of a legal system is based upon a 
teleologically based moral duty for society to survive. This is referred to as the "minimum 
content of Natural Law." Survival of society, as an extended form of survi val of the ind ividual, 
is the only acce ptable necessary corU1ection between morality and law. Hart explains "to raise 
this or any other question concerning how men should li ve together, we must assume that their 
aim, generally speaking, is to li ve.") Morali ty, centrally concerned with "how men should live 
together" CalIDOt make any other necessary claim on law other than the claim that it is man's and 
society's objecti ve to survive. [n order to achieve "minimwn content", social rules and 
obligations are requ ired. These rules and obligations are what constitute a legal system. further 
explanation of Hart's rules will be disc ussed in pages 8-1 1 (Pedigree Thesis) . 
6 Hart, Concepl ~/Law pp. 181 -82 
./ Han, Concept ~fLalV pg. 192 
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To clarify, IP accepts morality as a system outside of law that may be employed in the 
interpretation and implementation of laws. As said earli er, law doesn ' t derive its basis from 
morality, only its specific function. 
Certain doubts as to the consistency of Hartial1 IP are raised when closely examined. 
Ci ting David HLune, Hart says "Human nature cannot by any means subsist without the 
association of individuals: and that association never could have place were no regard paid to the 
laws of equity and justice."s "Equity and justice," implying moral qualities, are necessary to the 
continuation of society (i.e. "association of individuals") . To which of Hart's claims should 
credence be given? Either "it is in no sense a necessal')' truth that laws reproduce or satisfy 
certain demands of morality", or "[ society] never could have place without [equity or justice ]" . 
While Hart does acknowledge this irregularity by elucidating his concept of the 
"minimum content of natural law", he does not totally reconc ile this view with his claim that law 
should not "reproduce demands of rn orality." It seems that Hart's purpose in formulating hi s 
concept of the "minimum content of Natural Law" was to establish the definition of law as one 
partially al1d nominally defi ned by morality, and thereby independent from it in future analysis. 
However, tho ugh morality ' s role is initia ll y min imal, it is nonetheless necessary in the 
identification of a legal system. 
By analogy, consider the parallel claim "that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws 
reproduce or satisfy certain demands of' mathematics. While thi s claim seems tolerable at first 
glance, one must keep in mind Hart's other claim that the purpose of law is to ensure the 
existence of society. Society is 311 org311ization of two or more indi vidual s. Buil t into the notion 
of society is a mathematical principle of multiple individuals. Similarly, built into the notion of 
law is a moral principle of equity 311d justice. It does not adequately exempt morality fr0111 law 
8 Hart, Concept ~lLalV pg. 191 
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by presuming that if morality's initial influence is inherent in defining law, then further moral 
impacts can be discarded. 
Again, one must ask which of these contradicto ry claims is to be accepted. 
Exclusiona.rv Pos i ti vism 
Joseph Raz. the principle ad vocate of Exclusionary Positi ViSIll (EP), denies any reli ance 
of law upon morality. He argues for an in terpretation of the law on strictly social grounds, 
excluding any moral claims as legally considerable. "Sources of law include both the 
circumstances of its promulgation and relevant interpretati ve materials, such as court cases 
involving its application9 ,. 
A variety of reasons are given as to why morality and law should remain separate 
endeavors. When evaluating a judge's decision, law wo uld be greatl y sti gmati zed if the general 
perception was that the judge's decision was due to personal moral beliefs. The current common 
notion of lalY is one of objecti vity and entwinement with morality. If that belief were to change, 
authority of the courts would d iminish. 
Furthermore, a system of law in whichjudges are tasked with determining the morality 
behi nd every law wo uld encum ber the judiciary. One can imagine a system in whichjudges 
must weigh each law against another. Figurati vely speaking, the weight given to particular 
morals may be more substantial, depending on whichjudge receives tJle case. The law must be 
perceived as independent of mora l constraints if society is to accept its influence. 
Another argument fo r EP is that mora lity and law are independent fields. Morality is an 
outside value system which can but need not be used in the execution of law. An exanlination of 
the Eighth Amendment will prove ti-uitful in th is regard. The Eighth Amendment specifies that 
9 KeJUleth Himma. I EP 
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"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted."lo The language used in the Eighth Amendment, typical of many laws, is 
value-laden. In other words, it requires a system outside of the law to determine how those laws 
are to be enacted. If the mechanism fo r determining value-laden laws was intra-legal , then a 
central tenet of EP would be violated. for thi s reason, the definition of val ue-Iaden laws must be 
assessed by an outside means. In this case, morality is the non-legal system required. The 
Online Stanford Encyclopedia offers anoUler insightful analogy. The analogy is between 
mathematics used in the Income Tax and moral ity used in legal systems. The law, in directing a 
mathematical requirement, is not necessarily composed ofmaUlematics. In similar maJUler, 
though the law may direct a moral requirement, morality is not a necessary component of law. I I 
EP also explains how morality can become diffused into law. By considering moral 
claims when det lmining a case. Ulrough the method described before, a judge is creating new 
law and setting legal precedent. Because tbe case was dec ided by a legall y-authoritative source--
the judge-- it becomes law. In future situations. when similar cases arise. the law bas been 
determined. Thus. moral claims are di sregarded and law can bui ld upon itself, independent from 
moral claims. Once ilie judge decides, the law ceases to be questionable and progress is made. 
In this way, the most that morality can affect law is to instruct authorities to employ 
e.xtra- legal tools. However, these meaJ1S do not supersede law. 
One criticism of EP is that its differentiations between morality and law are merely 
semantic. If morality is within the law or outside Ule law, it is still necessary for the 
interpretation of certain laws. While Jaw's foundation lllay be bereft of morality, it nonetheless 
is essential in the implementation of Ja w. aJld therefore is integral to law. Other extra-legal 
10 JRank _ Lega l Pos iti vism 
11 Stanford Encyclopedia - Legal Posit ivism 
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systems supposedly similar to morality. such as mathematics, offer few services that law would 
cons ider essentia l. One can imagine a system in which algebra or geometry is forgone from law. 
While areas of the law would certainly be inhibited. such as taxation and construction law, 
society would continue to function to a degree. However, it is much more difficult to imagine a 
legal system in which moral input is entirely prohibited . Laws such as the Eighth Amendment 
prohibiting "cruel and unusual puni slunent" would become verbose and cumbersome as the legal 
system struggled to adeq uately define and prohibit divers vices. 
Because of its emphasis on legal precedent and rejection of extra- legal sources, it 
becomes questionable on what grounds judges are rendering decisions. 
The Roots of Law 
The Pedigree Thesis, a central component of Positi vism, holds that the leg itimacy of law 
(legal validity) is founded on social fac ts. The recognition of these social facts is the subject of 
various Positivist theories. Perhaps the original Positivist theory - JOIUl Austin 's Command 
theory - is most demonstrati ve of the Pedigree Thesis. 
Jeremy Bentham and Jolm Austin , some of the first Positivists, artic ulated the idea that a 
lega l system is one in which a sovereign issues commands and is obeyed without ap peal to a 
higher authority. Always backed UJl by the threat of force/coercion, the sovereign's conmlands 
are legally binding in his society. Austin' s view has been termed the Conunand Theory. 
Conmland Theory had many di screpancies. and H.L.A. Hillt was a leading critic in 
articulating millly of those criticisms. Austin' s theory failed to account for govenullents with no 
discernable sovereign. Systems that wo uld be excluded from their theory wo uld include 
parl iamentary and legislatively based governments. In such govenunents where power resides 
8 
with the population, lawmakers, though granted certain coercive powers, do not possess ultimate 
sovereign authority. 
Constitutional governments also present di fficulties to Austin ' s Command Theory. 
According to Austin, a sovereign has no legal restrictions placed upon him. Neither he nor 
another body may place limits on the coercive/legal power of the sovereign. In constit utional 
governments, this is obviously a problem. 
In the United States fo r example, courts accept the restrictive powers of the Constitution 
as legally binding. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Consti tution states that the 
"Consti tution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby."'" Austin, in answering this dilemma, provides a poor answer. Such 
Constitutional govenU11ent's self-imposed restrictions are merely "positive morality" l] 
Using the colorful analogy of a gUIU11an, Hart cri ticized Austi n's theory as being over-
simplistic. In Hart' s analogy a gunman commands a teller to give him the money in the banJe 
The analogy is meant to ill ustrate the difference between the obligations of the law and threats of 
an individual. According to Austin 's Conunand Theory, the gumnan's tlu'eats are equivalent to 
the tlu'eats of a sovereign and thus woul d qualify as law. Austin' s theory fai ls to account for this 
discrepancy; in lawful societies, not j ust any individual with some power of coercion is able to 
issue lawful commands. 
It should be noted, as P.M.S . Hacker appropriately did, that Hart 's theory was to be a 
conglomeration of both Austin's Command Theory and Kelsen's Pure Theory of Lawl4 While 
12 Kenneth Himma. IEP 
13 Austin , John, Le~{lIres 017 .Jurisprudence and {he Phdosophy of Positive Law 
I~ SO as not to dil ute the focus of this paper, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law wilt not be discussed herein. However, 
readers interested in Lega l Posit iv ism will fmd Kelsen's theory strikingly si milar and worth eval uation. 
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Austin relied upon a "law-creating organ [i.e.] (the legal sovereign)" 1 5 to define law, Kelsen's 
analysis was based on a " law-creating norm (the basic norm),,16 Hart, partially rejecting and 
accepting both, establi shes hi s theory as one sociologicall y based - norms or social customs -
fo und in, but not necessarily created by, legal organs - courts. 
For these reasons and more, Hart reformulated Positivism fr0111 the traditional Austinian 
version and argued for an interpretat ion of legal systems as rule-based. Hartian Positivism 
consists of primary, secondary, and further sub-labeled rules to categori ze the legal system. 
I/ou's Th eo n ' 17 
.-----
Social hahils 
Human behaviuur 
Sm.:i ai ruks 
--------- ---------- -----
EliquellC. 
chcs~ etc 
Ohli":JJ.i~' ~ ------------~ Mora lily 
Pri mary rule!:> S~CI, l/lela!"y rllll:~ 
Sanction 
Recogni tion 
Ch ange 
Adjuu icati(1I1 
As can be seen in the diagram above, law is derived from social rules, or social facts. In 
this way, Hartian Positivism reli es heavily upon social practices, customs. and traditions to 
determine lalV. Primary rules (referred to by Hart as rules of the firs t type) are designed to 
regulate the acti ons of ind ividuals (coercion). While primary rules are necessary in the 
maintenance of a lawful soc iety, a society must not subsist on them alone. Because law is based 
15 P.M.S. Hacker. Law, Morolil)" Clnd Society pg. 22 
16 P.M.S. Hacker, Lall', Moralily, cmd Sociely pg. 22 
rI Doc Stac 
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on social facts, and social practices change and evolve, it must refl ect social norms in any given 
lawful society. These changes are made through secondary rules. Secondary rules serve basic 
needs of the legal system. They recognize, change. and enac t (adjudication) the law. 
Kenneth Hinuna offers a smart summation of Hart's three Secondary rules : 
(I ) the rule of recognition, which 'spec ifies some feature or features 
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative 
ind ication that it is a rule of the group to be suppOited by the social pressure 
it exerts'; (2) the rule of change, which enables a soc iety to add, remove, 
and modify valid rules; and (3) the rule of adj udication, which provides a 
mechanism for determining whether a va lid rule has been violated. On 
Hart' s view, then, every society with a full -blown legal system necessarily 
has a rule of recognition that arti cul ates criteria for legal validity that 
include provisions for making. changing and adj udicati ng law. Law is, to 
use Hart 's famous plu'ase, " the union of primary and secondary n lles ." ls 
When "social structures" (society) consist exclusively of primary rules, they are 
primitive. Primiti ve structures are "pre-legal" and have "tlu'ee main defects". These defects, 
unti l corrected by secondary rules, perpetuate non-legal status. The first of these "defects" is 
IIncer/aimy. Similar to our traditions of etiquene, there is no authoritative source to identi fy and 
clarify what the customs are . "Hence if doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to the precise 
scope of some given rule, there wi ll be no procedure for settling thi s doubt, either by reference to 
an authoritati ve text or to an official whose declarations on this po int are auth oritative." 19 This 
18 Kenneth Him ma, IEP 
19 Han, Concepl qf Lenv pg. 92 
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point is especially important fo r modern law. One need only imagine a society where no 
distinguishable standard existed for the determination of its member' s actions. If an action was 
questionable. who or what wo uld determine the consequences to that action? 
The second characteristic of primiti ve societies is the sialic nature of their rules. "There 
will be no means, in such a society, of deliberately adapting the rul es to changing circumstances, 
either by eliminating old rules or introducing new ones" 7.0 When customs change, as is 
inevitable due to human nature. rules and obligations ll1ust reflect those changes. However, in 
primitive societies, there is no authoritative means to enact those changes . Similar to the 
aforementioned authority problem, Sialic rules are ingrained and unchangeable except through 
long slow processes of psychological acceptance. 
The third defect is inefficiency. Unable to unitedly punish violators, primitive societies 
lack special agencies existing to exert "social pressure involving physical effort or. .. use of 
force"?' I 
Rule of Recogn ition: Its Function 
An effecti ve summary of the Rule of Recognition was made by D.J. Galligan " [the Rule 
of Recognition] determines which officials have authority to make law, the limits oflheir 
authority, and, when disputes arise, who may resolve them. The second task ... is to confer on 
specific rul es their authority as laws ... As a legal obl iga ti on, it is di stinct from other kinds of 
obligation. such as one of a moral or religious nature. it s consequences being that legal rules 
constitute reasons for officials to act in a certain way. and for their actions to be regarded as 
l 'd ,,1.). va 1 • 
20 Hart, Concepl of Law pp. 92-93 
21 Hart , Concept o/Law pg. 93 
22 Galligan, Lall' ;17 A10dern Society pg. 84 
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Brian Leiter, remarking on the Pedigree Thesisn explained the difference between 
custom and law by highl ighting the Rule of Recognition. Without the Rule of Recognition he 
says, speeding on a highway and eating with one's mouth open wou ld be equivalent. The Rule 
of Recognition is crucial in differentiating the two. Furthermore, individuals intuiti vely 
understand the difference betlVeen a legislature 's regulation ofa highway and an ordinary 
citizen's regulation of a highway. Both might seek to enforce their will, but only one has the 
authority of law. The Rule of Recognition is the socially obligating force that identifies and 
separates law from other ' norms.' 
Hart's Rule of Recogn ition is decidedly social in origin and nature. It arises out of 
practice and aIJows the legal system to have ob ligation. Without the Rule of Recognition, Hart' s 
system of primary and secondary rules would be insufficient in ·recognizing' what is law. 
Interestingly, as pointed out by the Internet Encyclopedia ofPhi losoph/ 4, the citi zenry ofa 
lawful society need not lUlderstand that the Rule of Recognition is the method by which its 
officials identify law. "The reality of the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary citizens -
perhaps a majority - have no general conception of the legal structure or its criteria of 
validity."" 
All that is needed for the Rule of Recognition to function is that offic ials accept their own 
behavior and practices as conforming to the law. In other words. if authori ti es accept that they 
are the authoriti es and that their practices/actions must fa ll in line to certain standards, the law, 
then by the very nalLlre of the authorities being authorities. citizens will accept their 
practices/actions as law. 
23 Referred to by Leiter as rhe "Soc ial Thesis" 
2~ Keruleth Himma, lEP 
'1) Hart. Concept of La II' pg. III 
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indeterminacy in Positivism 
Ronald Dworkin. fo remost amongst modern crit ics of Positivism, levels an interesting 
dilemma. With in law, there exist certain cases where the law is silent. This is referred to as 
indeterminacy, when the law gives confli cting or no guidance to a particular situation. 
Indeterminacy can also arise from situations in which the law directs an outcome contrary to 
moral ity or ' sits uneasily in our gut.' Dworkin arg ues thaliP offers no solution to indeterminate 
cases. Citing a New York appellate court case, Riggs v Palmer, Dworkin argues that IP cannot 
account for the court' s legal decision. An explanation of Riggs v Palmer is needed. In the words 
of di ssenting j udge John Gray " [Riggs], a lad of 16 years of age, bei ng aware of the provisions in 
hi s grandfather's will, which constituted him the residuary legatee of the testator's estate, caused 
hi s death by poison, in 1882. For this crime he was tried. and was convicted of murder in the 
second degree ... This action was brought by two of the children of the testator for the purpose of 
having those provisions of the will in the respondent 's favor canceled and annulled.,,)6 
In this case, the law was quite specific in its direction, namely, that the will was in effect 
and the ' lad' should receive his inlleritance. As Dworkin pointed out "the court began its 
reasoning with this admission: ' it is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and 
effect of wi ll s. and the devolution of property, if literally constHled, and if their force and effect 
can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modifi ed, give this property to the 
d ··,71 l11ur erer. ·· . 
Dworkin 's contention is that lP 's view of the lalV is too narrow and doesn' t properl y 
account for holV the court ruledn There being two alternat ives in this case, an analysis wi ll be 
16 Riggs v. Palmer - See hrrp:llwww.cooler-ulen.com/cases.htl11#Riggs%20v.%20 Palmer 
27 Dworkin, Taking Rights Serious~v pg.23 
28 Funher reading of Riggs v Palmer revea ls that moral justification was used in the majority's opinion "No Olle 
shall be permitted 10 profit by his own fraud, or to lake advamage of his own wrong. or to found any claim upon his 
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given of both with the difficulties arising for IP. If the law was executed as prescribed, the will 
going into effect and the courts transferring property to Riggs, then broad social consensus 
(feeling that the law is unjust) might derail the va lidity of the law because the rule of recognition 
would give conflicting guidance. The rule of recognition refl ects what is acceptable to those 
governed and the view of those in authority. If a law passed by authoritative fig ures is legal in 
the authori ties' eyes yet inva lid in those governed. then is the law still va lid? Because the law 
did not meet the validity req uirement for social acceptance (being unj ust). and IP unable to 
provide an adequate explanation, is IP a coherent theory? 
The other al ternative. the one actually chosen by the court. also presents a problem for II' . 
The fact that the court did consult extra-lega l sources in its decision points to the nanow concept 
of law employed by IP. R ightly argued, a theory of law is insuffic ient if its theories are 
dramatica ll y different in practice. 
Hart answers Dwork in ' s cri ticism by clarifying his theory of Posit ivism. His theory does 
not, as Dworkin says, seek ' ultra-gu iding laws'. (stipulating the fact that indeterminacy is a 
necessary component of legality,) but rather it tolerates indeterminacy in the law. Hart only 
wonders to what degree indeterminacy is acceptable. "Even if laws could be framed that could 
settle in advance all possible q uestions that could arise about their meaning. to adopt such laws 
would often war with other aims which law should cheri sh. A margin of uncertainty should be 
tolerated, and indeed welcomed in the case of many legal rules, so that an informed j udicial 
decision can be made when the composition of an unforeseen case is known and the issues at 
stake in its dec ision can be identified and so rationally se ttled .,,79 
own iniquity. or to acquire propelty by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public po licy, have their 
foundation in un iversa l law administered in all civi lized cou ntries. and have nowhere been superseded by statutes." 
- Riggs v Palmer - See http: //www.coorer-ulen.com/cases.htm#Riggs%20v.%20Pall1ler 
7.9 Hart , Concept of Law pg. 252 
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The "j udicial decision" of which Hart speaks occurs when "existing law fai ls to dictate 
any decision as the correct one.,,30 Hart comments that the judge should "act as a conscientious 
legislator. . . by deciding according to his own beliefs and values . ,,31 
Referring to Hart' s conscientious legislators, Dworkin considers them to be judges 
engaged in unjust ex post facto law making. If ajudge creates law where it is previously si lent, 
and then that law is used in a I11at1J1er to sanction an action that was previously wuawful 
(wliawful in that the law did not regat'd it) . then these quasi legislatively-active judges are 
enacting law in an unacceptable fashion. 
Hart defended hi s tlleory oflegislati ve ly-acti ve judges from Dworkin by referring to the 
accusation of the unjustness of"ex post facto law making" as ungrounded. The unfairness of 
usual "ex post facto law making" was based on cases in which atl action occurred under the 
former clear-guiding law, and was later changed "ex post facto". However, Hart rightly points 
out that it "seems quite irrelevant in hard cases since these are cases which the law has left 
incompletely regulated and where there is no known state of clear established law to justify 
expectations.,,3? In other words, with no "expectations" to satisfy, the law cannot be unjust when 
determined by the judge. 
Until Hart's 1994 Postscript to Dworkin. Hartian Positivism was thought to exclude 
moral conside rations. However, with Hart's recen t reformulation, morality in law may be 
exercised in judicially indeterminate cases. Ifmorality is an acceptable criterion for tlJe 
interpretation of law, what of one of its central premises: '·[that it is tlle] simple contention that it 
is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality,,?33 
30 Hart, COl1cepl of Law pg. 273 
31 Hart. Concept ojL(flr pg. 273 
~2 Hart, Concept 0/ Lall' pg. 276 
33 HaI1, Concept o.lLaw pg. 192 
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Specifically concerning the outcome of Riggs v Palmer, it seems that the law certainly 
acquiesced to the "demands of morality." With Hart' s adaptations, one is left to wonder what IP 
offers as a legal theory. 
Fwther, if Hart 's explanation is true, then how canjudges be expected to rule on an area 
previously umegulated? Ifno expectation ex ists for ajudge to vio late, conversely, how can a 
judge pass a legitimate ruling based on ... nothing. Something is clearly lacking from l-lrut's 
explanation. 
Kantian Lega l Positivism: 
An Oxymoron? 
introduction 
Immanuel Kant is known as many things: theo logist, rnetaphysicist genius, moral 
philosopher ... but what about Legal Positi vist? Jurisp rudential theories have trad itionally 
compared Kant' s legal philosophy to Natural Law theory. forming a del icate relationship 
between the two; howeve r, is this comparison accurate? This section will argue that Kant's 
analysis oflaw was fundamentally Legal Positivist in doct rine. First, Krult 'S moral philosophy 
will be explained. After. Kantian ethics wil l be compared ru1d contrasted with Legal Positivism. 
Finally, irreconcilable flaws in Krult' S reasoning will also discussed. 
Kant's Moral Philosophy 
Underlying much of Kant' s writings on the nature of soc iety and law is a Legal Positivist 
tone . This tone will be explored in tlU'ee ways. 
Rights 
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In his famo us Categorical Imperative Kant states "act only according to that maxim 
whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.,,34 Topically this 
wo uld seem contrary to the Legal Positivist approach to rights. for a Kantian, in order for all 
actions to be moral, they must be hypothetically expandable to all persons. If an action wo uld 
violate this principle, it would somehow violate an individual' s rights. In contrast, a Legal 
Positi vist would employ sociological means to determine whether an action violated some degree 
of normalcy in a given society. Yet further inspection reveals Kant's true purpose when put in 
the legal context. 
"However well disposed and law-abiding men might be, it still lies a priori in the rationa l 
Idea of such a condition ... that before a public la wful condition is established, indi vidual men, 
peoples, and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own 
right to do what seems right and good to it. ,,35 In a state of nature, Kant believed that all persons 
will ultimately do what they think is best. In this state of nature, persons would use empirical 
j udgment, which is inherently subjective . Morality for Kant was something ac hieved t1u-ough 
reason. In a state of nature, people would rely upon thei r personal judgment to determine what 
"seems right and good" to do . Because those judgments are based on empirical influences, they 
are ' COlTUpt' and inadequate for uni versal application. Thus, in order for morality to be possible, 
the state of nature must be left behind and persons must enter into a social compact, submitting 
to laws t11at can be universally applied. These laws. though perhaps not perfect ly just, are 
preferable to an existence in which reason - and t11uS morality - is absent36 
3.1 Hackett. Grounding/or 'he Melaphysics a/Morals pg. 30 
35 Jeremy Waldron, Kant 's Legal Posirivisl1I - See http: //www.jstoLorgisrable/pdfplus/ 13!l202-1.pdf 
36 For further discussion on the relationship between morality and government) see 
hnp://www.cfh.ufsc.br/erhic({i)/et52an3.pdf Cynthia Schossberger appl ies a similar principle, arguing that morality 
is inconceivable in the state ofnaUlre. Perhaps sim ilar to incompatibilities arrived at by Kant, i.e. the 'lying 
prom ise: the categorical imperative is impossib le to universalize in the state of nature. For the moment an 
individua l universalizes a maxim, then the concept of the state of nature has been left. 
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Necessity of Public Officials 
Kant believed the state was necessary in order for rights and freedoms to exist. A 
rephrasing of Kant's statement, keeping its original intent, could be: ' [each indi vidual) has [his 
or her) own right to do whal seems righl and good to it, [which leaves morality unattainable, 
until states come into being.)' jf every individual was to have freedom of wi ll and rights, then 
some inte rcessory being would need to inte ract. Otherwise, as Kant hypothesized, freedom of 
the will would be hampered as some individuals violated others ' rights. 
This intercessory being, taking the form of the slate and the state's executors, i.e. public 
servants/officials, would necessarily coerce certain individuals when those indi viduals violated 
the freedom of others. A state wo uld be morally justified in pursuing thi s course of act ion if its 
doing so allowed for greater freedom of wil l. 
Two hypothetical examples will be useful in demonstrating this - one involving an 
environmel1l where publ ic officials are absent, the other a modern society. 
I . Treg is gathering apples for the coming winter. Upon finding a sufficient amount of 
apples, Treg puts the app les in a pile at the entrance to his cave and enters the cave to sleep. 
Geth is walking along when he discovers the food supply. Knowing these apples were gathered 
for the sustenance of another, Geth nonetheless decides 10 take the appl es regardless of the 
consequences for Treg. Treg awakens awhile later, discovers ulat his stockpile is missing but is 
unable to gather anymore apples and starves as a result. According to Kant, Geth 's actions were 
immoral because he treated someone else as a means. His actions couldn' t be duplicated 
universally. Finally, and perhaps most wrongly. Geth deprived Treg of the freedom of choice. 
death severely limiting Treg's choice-making abil ities. 
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2. Greg is gathering eno ugh money for the retirement years. Upon depositing a 
sufficient amoul1l of money in the bank, Greg retires to Arizona to lVatch reruns of MASH and 
Matlock. Beth, an employee of the bank and an identity thief, is searching for helpless victims to 
take advantage of. Upon discovering Greg's savings account, Beth decides to take the money 
regardl ess ofLhe consequences for Greg. A while later Greg receives a notice from the bank of 
his insufficient funds. Greg becomes a Wal-Mart greeter to pay for his twilight activities and 
simultaneously informs the sheriff s department of the theft. Upon investigation, Beth is caught 
and forc ed to rellU'n the money to Greg. Though the sheriff s department coerced Beth into 
returning Greg's resources, their actions were moral because they acted in a way that could be 
wliversa ll y willed. 
Thus, some manifestation of the state's power to intervene is necessary. 
Interestingly, in Kant' s view, an action can be 1110ral. despite its superficial immorality -
if it preserves the freedom of others. Yet tllis contradi cts Kant 's reply to Swi ss philosopher 
Benjamin Constant. Constant inquired of Kant as to whether it was morally justifiable to lie to 
protect someone from a murderer. Writing in his On (/ Supposed Righi 10 Tell Liesfi'oll1 
Benevolenl Molives, Kant defended the application of his theory and verified that it was morally 
wrong to lie to a murderer even when the murderer' s inunoral intent is known. 
Kant 's views seem contradictory. On one hand he believes states are morally justifi ed in 
their coercive powers, yet he also believes individual s can never lie. even to protect another. 
Perhaps for Kant, inaction by the state in even one instance is substantially more dangero us to 
universal freedom than occasional impairment of individual freedom. for example, imagine that 
Beth from the previous story had instead been framed , and the sheriff kno ws her innocence. 
After deliberation by the courts, she is to be executed in the public square. If the state 
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approached the sheriff inquiring her whereabouts, would he be morally allowed to lie on her 
behalf? If freedom is to exist for anyone, the state must exist. And for the state to continue, its 
orders/laws must be obeyed. The sheriffs decision thus precipitates between denying freedom 
for one or denying freedom for all. 
Although, of course. it wou ld be wrong for the Kantian sheriff to cons ider the possible 
consequences of his actions, he wo uld still have difficulty in making a decision ifhe considered 
the problem as choosing between lying and obeying the state. Both seem to have a first order 
moral obligation to be followed. but are mutually exclusive. 
Kant endorses both possibilities thus producing confusion. He is both adamant that the 
state - tlu'ough the will of the sovereign - was to have fina l say in all coercive decisions, and that 
it is never morally permissible to treat another as a means to an ends. This dilenuna is murky 
water for Kant. 
A further concern is whether Kant has violated hi s deontological ideology by producing 
legal views that are large ly cOl1sequentialist. Despite these complexit ies, Kant shares the view 
wi th Legal Positi vists that public officials are a necessary part of the law. 
Will of the Sovereign 
The third element in our focus is the concept of the sovere ign. Jolm Austin . one of the 
original fomenters of Lega l Positi vism. argued that law is nothing more than the commands of 
the sovereign. This sovereign. an ungoverned governor, is the origi nal source of law. Though 
his laws create duties for the subjects of a state, he is the only indi vidual upon whom no legal 
duty to observe the law exists. The definition of a sovereign can be simplified as : "one who 
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receives habitual obedience from the bulk of the population, but who does not habitually obey 
any other (earthly) person or institution.,,37 
Kant's thoughts on the topic are surprisingly similar to Austin's. "Man's equality as a 
subject migbt be formu lated as fo llows. Each member of the conunonwealth has rights of 
coercion in relation to all the others except in relation to the head of state. for he alone is not a 
member of the commonwealth, but its creator or preserver, and he alone is authorized to coerce 
others without being subj ect to any coercive law himself. But all who are subject to laws are the 
subjects of the state, and are thus subj ect to the right of coercion along with all other members of 
the conunonwealth; the only exception is a single person (in either the physical or the moral 
sense of the word) the head of state, tlu'ough whom alone tlle rightful coercion of all other 
members can be exercised. for if he too could be coerced, he would not be the head of state, and 
the hierarchy of subordination would ascend infini tely. ,,38 
Admittedly, modern Legal Positivists are apt to distinguish themselves from Austin 's 
problematic theori9; nevertheless, Kantian and early Legal Positivist views of the command-
origin of the law are nearly synonymous. 
Kant's statements present an interesting if not unenlightened picture: a sovereign who 
must issue commands that are wliversally applicable yet at tlle same time inapplicable to himself. 
A seeming contradiction, perhaps Kant was not able to fully elaborate his meaning. 
An End to Conjectures 
While many more factors would need to be considered before Kant was conclusively 
labeled a Legal Positivist, Kant's political views do indicate such a legal positivist mentality. 
37 Stanford Encyclopedia - Aust in, John 
38 Immanuel Kant, TheOf~Y and Praclice, Pari 2 - See hnp:l/www.Sllssex.ac.ukJUsers/sefdO/tx/tp2.htm 
39 The principle difference betvveen modern and early Legal Positivism bei ng the 20th Century Legal Positivist 
emphasis of sociological means to define law. 
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Drawing upon the words of the pbilosopher himself, "In law a man is guilty when he violates the 
rights of others. In ethics he is guilty ifhe only thinks of doing SO. ,,40 Kant, employing a form of 
the Separabil ity thesis, saw morality and law as separate entities. Eerily Austinian in nature41 , 
Kant's jurisprudential views are reservedly Positivist in theory. For these and other reasons, 
Kant's reclassification as a Legal Positivist should receive further attention. 
Lega l Positivism: Anti-Religious Code or Religiously To lerant 
A Case Example In vo lving Mo rmonism 
Introduction 
"We believe in being subject to kings. presidents, miers, and magistrates, in obeying, 
honoring, and sustaining the law.,,4 7. Written by the Mormon propbet Joseph Smith in the year 
1842, only 12 years after the found ing of the LDS chu rch43 , the LDS fa ith has departed from 
traditional Clu'istian understandings of law by adopting a view compatible with H.L.A. Hart's 
legal positivism. This section will demonstrate why the Mormon approach to government and 
law is agreeable with Legal Positivism44, focusing on Hart's theory. In order to do this, 
explana tions of Mormon doctrinal beliefs will be given with emphasis placed on scriptlu'al and 
JO Attributed to Immanuel Kant 
oil "The ... law is one thing: its merit and demer it another." John Austin, The Province a/Jurisprudence De/ermined 
pg. 18/1 
J2 Sm ith, Joseph. Arlicles of Faifh. Pg. I 
43 umerous offshoots of Mormonism exist both within and outside the United States. For marters of simplicity and 
foc us, the largest offshoot - The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Sainls (LDS) - will be evaluated in this art icle. 
Various names and terms apply to the LDS church; these will be used interchangeably and with slight distinction . 
..\..\ ·'Legal Positi vism," " Posit ivism," and "Hart's theory" are all used interchangeably in this al1icle. 
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historical examples. H.L.A. I-Iart's legal positivist theory will also be briefly introduced with key 
theses for compare and contrast shown. 
Mo rmon Doctrinal Beli efs 
As stated earlier, one of the 13 core articles of faith states that Mormons "believe in being 
subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying. honoring, and sustaining the 
law." At the center of Mormon belief is the understanding that two categories of laws exist: 
hea venly laws and ealthly laws. Not mutually exclusive nor completely compatible, heavenly 
laws and earthly laws serve different fWlctions. While heavenly laws pertain to irrevocable 
commands given by deity, earthly laws pertain to the institutions and governments presiding over 
peoples and slates. 
Pedigree Thes is & Mormonism 
"We believe that governments were instituted of God fo r the benefit of man; and that he 
ho lds men accountable for their acts in relation to them. both in making laws and administering 
them, for the good and safety of society ... We believe that all governments necessarily requi re 
ci vil officers and magistrates to enforce the laws of the same; and that such as will administer the 
law in equity and justice should be sought for and upheld by the voice of the people if a republic, 
or tJle will of the sovereign. ,,45 Mormonism. as a Christian-based faith. is interesting in that it 
leaves trad itional dogma by accepting the validity of earthly law despite any moral 
quali fications. Its teachings include instructions to obey authorities oftJle law without recourse 
to moral value for validity. President Marion G. Romney of the First Presidency (the highest 
council of the Church) taught the importance of legal authority to tJle LOS Church. "Civil 
4) Smith, Joseph. Doctrine and Covenants J 3-1 pg. ? 
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authority is of di vine origin. It may be more or less adapted to the needs of man; more or less just 
and benevolent, but, even at its worst, it is better than anarchy.,,·'6 Past president of the LDS 
Church Joseph f. Smith echoed the same. citizens of the Church should "be subject to the 
powers that be," 47 i.e ., civil authorities. 
Mormon conceptions of law stretch beyond the common belief in the separation of 
church and state. While many churches, including Mormonism, promote separation of religion 
and govenunental bodies, the majo rity ascribe to the Natu ral Law Theory for an evaluation of 
law. A traditional Christ ian view might be "Laws are valid to the degree they conform with 
certain moral qual ities." Mormonism, however. grasps the relationship differently. The validity 
oflaw, as SUI1Ulled up clearly by Pres ident N. Eldon Ta rll1er. sustains the legal positivist views 
that state authority grants legal va lidity. "There are many who question the constitutionality of 
certain acts passed by their respective governments. even though such laws have been 
established by the highest courts in the land as being constitutionaL and they fee l to defy and 
di sobey tlle law. Abraham Lincoln once observed: 'Bad laws, if they exist, shou ld be repealed as 
soon as possible; sti ll, whi le tlley contin ue in force. they should be religiously observed. ' This is 
the attitude of the Chmch in regard to law observance.,,48 So, though a law may be morally 
hideous, it is still legally valid4 9 
True to the Legal Positivist thesis. President Tanner' s wo rds are similru' to those of 
Hart's . " What these [positivists) were. in tlle main, concerned to promote was clru'ity ruld 
honesty in the formulation of the theoretical and moral issues rai sed by the ex istence of 
pru"ticular laws which were morally iniquitous but were enacted in proper form, cleru' in meaning. 
~G Marion G. Romney. The Rlile of Law: Ensign pg. 2 
-17 Smith, Joseph. Ductrine and Covenants 58 pg. ? 
" N. Eldon Talmer, The Lmps ~fGod; Ensign pg. 82 
-1 9 Smith, Joseph. Doctrine and Covenants 58 pg. ? 
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and satisfied all the acknowledged criteria of validity of a system . Their view was that, in 
thinking about such laws, both the theorist and the unfortunate offic ial or pri vate citizen who was 
called on to apply or obey them, could only be confused by an invitation to refuse the title of 
' law' or 'valid' to them. They tho ught that... we should say 'This is law; but it is too iniquitous 
to he applied or obeyed. '" Further Positivist comments solidify the relationship between 
Mormonism and Legal Positivism. "Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine 
law are not bind ing. that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious 
laws, and therefore those which are 1110st opposed to the will of God, have been and continually 
are enforced as laws by judicial tribunals."so 
The Separation Thesis & Mormonism 
Partly treated in the previous thesis, Mormonism compares to Pos itivism in its rejection 
of the validity of law being morally based. Three spec ific examples wi ll assist in understanding 
this relationship. The first comes from the bedrock of Mormon belief, the Book of Mormon, in 
which an example of Legal Positi vism is to be found. Moriantonsi. an ancient king of the 
Jaredite people. was a wicked king who was peculiar in that he did "justice unto the people. but 
not unto himself. .. [and was] cut off from the presence of the Lord." This di stinction is 
important. While King Morianton was immoral, hi s rules and law were valid in the eyes of the 
people. The interpretation of this verse may be, 'Morianton did good works for the people, but 
evil fo r himself and in the eyes of God.' This passage contains two significant correlations to 
50 John Austin, The Province a/Jurisprudence Defermined pg. 18/1 - Credit to Brian Z. Tamanaha for bringing up 
this point Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy. Vol. 32: 2007 
51 Ether 10:9- 11 : 9. And it came to pass after the space of many years. Morianton ... did establish himself king over 
all the land. 10. And after that he had established himself king he did ease the bu rden of the people, by which he 
did gain favor in the eyes of the people. and they did anoint him to be their king. I I . And he did do j ustice 111710 (he 
people, b1l1 no! unto hill/set/because of his many whoredollls; where/ore he \lias CI/f oj}/j·om the presence of the 
Lord. 
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Legal Positivism. first, the people didn ' t consider Morianton's actions to be outside the domain 
oflega!. Hart explains why. "Those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's 
ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and ... its rules of recognition specifying 
the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adj udication must be effectively accepted 
as common public standards."5/. This case exemplifies how Positivism is integral in Mormonism 
and how Hart's Rule of Recognition functions. 
The second significant detail is the implied relationship hetween God and legal entities, 
in this case, a relationship between moral ity and lega l en ti ties. The Book of Mormon remarks 
that Morianton was "anoint[ed]" by the people "to be their king," While God, in this instance 
personifying morality, disappro ved of Morianton, Morianton was sti ll sovereign and hi s 
commands were nonetheless leg itimate. This relat ionship is insightful of what Mormons believe. 
As a piece of Mormon theology King Morianton's cOlUlection to moral ity helps form tlle way in 
which Mormons understand the law. 
The second example draws upon Mormonism's founder Joseph Smith. As will be seen, 
Smith's example is indicative of modern Morillon perceptions of law. Elder Jack Goaslind 
explains an encounter of Smith while residing in Nauvoo, "As mayor of Nauvoo, Joseph was 
called upon to render judgment on Anthony, a black man who had ... been se lling liquor in 
vio lation of the law ... Anthony implored Joseph for leniency, stating that he needed money to 
buy the freedom of his child held as a slave in a southern state. Joseph said, 'I am sorry, 
Anthony, but the law must be observed, and we will have to impose a fine ... ,53 One might 
attribute Smi th's atti tude to racial currents of his day; however, Smith 's perception of the 
) 2 Hart, Concept a/Law pg. 116 
" Elder Jack Goaslind, BYU Devotional Joseph Smi/h 's Chris/like E111ribu/es 27 June 1995 
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validity of law changes in light of his personal abolitionist sentiments 54 Running for President 
in 1844, Smith's platform included a complete ban on slavery by 1850 and freedom for existing 
slaves. 55 The issue is further compounded by Smith 's obvious understanding of the moral 
implications of taking Anthony's money. Imposing the fine would surely limit Anthony's ability 
to fi·ee his son. To minimize the impact of the fine, Smith sold a horse to contribute money for 
the release of Anthony's son56 
Smith's seemingly contrary ind ividual and political actions are derived from his Legal 
Positivist understanding of the law. In the words of John Austin, " the existence of law is one 
thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be 
not conformable to an ass umed standard, is a different enquiry.,,57 Smith knew the law 
prescribed punishment for Anthony: whether such a fi ne was moral or immoral was another 
matter. 
A third and more modern example of Monno nism adapti ng a Legal Positivist vie IV is the 
turn of the century fight over polygamy. While the two previous examples exhi bited 
Mormonism as deferential to lega l authority, the third involves conflict between heavenly law 
and earthly law. Openly "avow[ing],,58 plural marri age in 1852, the LDS Church's stance 
conunenced a series of legal attacks upon the LDS church. While a history of the struggle 
between the LDS church and U.S. government wo ul d be lengthy and beyond the present foc us, 
one aspect of the conflict is pertinent. Despite dispute over the morality of mandated 
:)~ ~'NIy cogitations, like Daniel's have for a long time troubled me, when I viewed the cond ition of men tlu·oughout 
the world, and more especially ill this boasted realm, where the Dec laration of Independence 'holds these truths to 
be self-evident. that alllTlen are created equa l: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; 
that among these are life, liberty: and the pursu it of happiness:' but at the same time some two or three millions of 
people are he ld as slaves for life, because the spirit in them is covered with a darker skin than ours," History of the 
Church, Vo1.6. Ch.8, pp. 197- 198 
55 History of the Church, Vol. 6:205 
" Elder Jack Goaslind. B YU Devotiona l Joseph SlIIith·s Christlike Allrihutes 27 June 1995 
JJ Stanford Encyclopedia - Legal Positivism 
J8 Gary C. Bryner, Political Teachings 
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monogamous marriage, Mormonism respected the claims of govenunent and its entities as 
legally binding. In 1904 special hearings were held to determine whether Senator-elect Reed 
Smoot could take his seat. In the ensuing hearings, President of the Church Joseph F. Smi th 
(grand-nephew of founder Joseph Smith), was ca lled to tes tify concerning Mormonism' s 
compliance with mounting legal pressure to adopt monogamous marriage. When Senator Hoar 
asked whether church revelation trumped legal responsibi lity. Smith's answer was that 
determination of the matter was fo r "[members to decide) whichever they pleased. ,,59 
Interestingly, Smith did not repudiate the legitimacy of the law. Tradi tional concept ions 
of religious authority are disposed to assess the law in its conformity to moral values. In other 
words, based on Natural Law theory's perception of law. as passed down tlu'ough western 
Clu·istianity. many churches would see law as illegitimate when it confl icted with religious/moral 
dogma; Mormonism is distinct in this regard. Departing from the main stream, Smith and 
Mormoni sm embrace Hart ' s Legal Positivist view that law is valid whether or not it embodies 
moral duties . 
Mo rmonism, Legal Positivism, and Immora l Laws 
Criti cs of Legal Positivism have at times misinterpreted the theory to endorse blind and 
imm oral obedience of the law. However, proponents of Legal Positivism are apt to point out this 
is not the case60 Mormonism provides a suitable model for recognizing the validity oflaw yet 
59 Name Unknown. What k/ormol1s Do When Lall's Conflict: New York Ti mes 5 Mar. 190/1; "Suppose YOll rece ived 
a reve lation commanding your peopl e to do something whi ch would confl ict with the law of the land. Which wou ld 
they have to obey?"-Sen. Hoar ·'V.,Ihichever they pleased, there is no compul sion ... Wi th me perhaps the reve lat ion 
wou ld be uppermost." -Pres. Sm ith 
60 "The ir discomfort is sometimes the product of confus ion. Lawyers often use 'positivist' abusively, to condemn a 
formal istic doctrine accord ing to which law is always clear and. however pointless or wrong. is to be rigorously 
app lied by officials and obeyed by subjects. It is doubtful that anyone ever held this view; but it is ill any case fa lse, 
it has noth ing to do with legal positivism, and it is expressly rejected by aU leading posit ivists." "The pecu liar 
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rejecting it on moral grounds. In the years leading up to the prohibition of polygamous 
marriage61 , Church members frequent ly saw tJle United States Govenunent's law as valid but 
immoral and therefore unable to follow it. The reflection of an early church member gi ves 
insight into how rank-and-file Mormons perceived the law. Upon learning that federal troops 
were being sent to Utah to enfo rce monogamous marriage laws, Richard Ballantyne remarked 
tJlat it "was a virtual declaration of war by a state against one of its own political subdi visions. ,,6) 
Though tJle govenmlent was conuuitting a foolish act against one of its own "subdivisions," in 
Ballantyne's eyes, tJle govenuuent/ law was still valid. 
Hrut. commenting on the sometimes confrontation between law and morality, said " what 
surely is most needed in order to make men clear-sighted in confronting the offic ial abuse of 
power, is that they should preserve the sense that the certi fication of something as legally valid is 
not conclusive of the majesty or authority which the officia l system may have, its demands must 
in the end be subm itted to a moral scrutiny. ,,63 "Moral scru tiny" is indeed fam iliar to 
Mormonism. When posed with the hypothetical si tuation of abandoning hi s children because of 
monogamous laws, Joseph F. Smith (then current president of the Church) rep lied to the 
heavenly law vs. earthly law conflict that '\mder the discipline that had been maintained for the 
last twenty years the peopl e in tJle Mormon Church wou ld obey the laws rather than any 
revelation which might be in conflict. .. but 1 should not I ike to be put into tJle position where j 
would be compelled to abandon my chi ldren. j could not do tl1at.,,64 Though certainl110ral 
bounds could be crossed. others wo uld not be. In determining which laws would be followed, it 
accusation that positivists believe the law is always to be obeyed is withollt foundation." - Stanford Encyc loped ia -
Legal Positivism 
Gl Smith , Joseph. Doctrine (Ind Covenants Official Declaration pg. 1 
62 Conway B. Sonne. Knighl a/the Kingdom page 171 
63 H.LA . Hart., Concept of Lalli page 210 
6-1 Name Unknown, What }\I10r1110115 Do When Laws COJ?f!icl; New York Times 5 Mar. 1904 
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is important to note that Smith explicitly cited moral eva luation in his answer. He didn't 
question the validity of the law, but only its consequences. 
Concl usion - Mormon ism and Positivism 
The ways in which Mormonism accepts Lega l Positivism are many and varied. As seen 
in the preceding examples, Mormonism has developed its recognition of the validity of law 
regardless of moral wlderpimungs. Tlu s connection is unique considering the religious nature of 
Mormonism. As time progresses further research will reveal whether Mormonism retains its 
LIIuque interpretation of law. 
Closing: Thoughts on Posit ivism 
To best understand Legal Positivism, one must remember how/why it was born. Natural 
Law theory had dominated western j urisprudence for centuries, with the result that little 
distinction was made between law and morality. The concept that "the existence oflaw is one 
thing; its merit and demerit another" 65 was radical at the ti me and has remained the centrally 
defining theme of Legal Posi tivism. 
Both Positivi sm's theme and its limited role are often overlooked. Unfortunately, the 
theory has been misapplied both within and outside j urisprudence. Perhaps the most common 
charge is that Legal Positi vism implies a fundamental submission to ' legal yet morally wicked 
6:> Austin 's doctrine, though inte llectually bare in comparison 10 Han" s. has remained tJl e mainstay of Legal 
Positivism through to today. 
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behavior. ' As Brian Bix points out, this is due to many individual's belief that a legal theory 
should answer "important questions of law and practical reasoning." However, as Bix advises 
"this complaint is not so much wrong as a misunderstanding. One should no more expect 
theories about the nature of law to guide behavior or answer difficult ethical questions than one 
should expect day-to-day guidance in life from theories of metaphysics.,,66 
It was under the former cbarge that H.L.A. Hart endeavored to show that Legal 
Positivism was indifferent to Nazi Germany. Some critics argued that Positivism - at the time 
gaining influence in Germany - may have contributed to the horrendous acts of the Second 
World War. Perpetrators commonly claimed they were ' following orders' or 'following the 
law; ' in this environment, without a true understanding of Positivism's purpose, the theory 
seemed malicious. 
To repeat Bix's point, attributing immoral acts to Legal Positivism is eqllivalent to 
blaming the spread of AIDS on a medical theory that analyzes disease epidemics. far from 
condoning, condemning, or applauding moral behavior, Positivisml11erely analyzes law; if 
anything, Positivism is simply indifferent to "important questions oflaw." 
Yet, as a fina l thought on the subject, Positivism's role has been both practical and 
analytical - raising doubts that the theory does not influence "important questions of law," as 
remarked by Brian Bix. By Hart's own admission, Legal Positivism was instrumental in 
supporting the Wolfenden Conunittee's recommendation67 that prostitution and homosexuality 
66 Brian Bix, The Blackwell Guide /0 'he Philosophy of Law and Legal Theol ) ; pg. 32 
6i "Much dissati sfaction has for long been fe lt in England with the criminal law relating to bOlh prostihItion and 
homosexuality, and in 195/1 the committee well known as the Wolfenden Committee was appointed to con sider the 
state of the law. This committee reported in September 1957 and recommended certain changes in the law on both 
topics"' H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and k/orality pg. 13 
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be de-criminalized in England, Due to Hart 's effecti ve reasoning, the committee eventually 
based its decision on the idea that "[morality is] not the law's business, ,,68 
For its advancement of jurisprudence and the demarcating of law and morality, Legal 
Positivism will long hold a unique position in legal academia - and rightly so , 
68 BBC Report on the Wolfenden Committee Report. Please See -
http://news.bbc.co.uk!onthisday/hi/dates/sto ries/september/4/newsid _3007000/3007686.stm 
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